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PROFESSIONALISM AND COMMUNITY: A RESPONSE
TO TERRELL AND WILDMAN
Robert E. Rodes, Jr.*
Professor Terrell and Mr. Wildman have earned our gratitude with
their sober, thoughtful, lucid, and honest contribution to the ongoing dis-
cussion of professionalism. They have examined the problems with a
sharp and critical eye, placed them in a social and historical perspective,
and offered modest but genuinely helpful suggestions for solving them.
They are quite free from the obfuscation and bombast that often appear
when people address this difficult subject. Best of all, they have resisted
the temptation to draw an invidious distinction between a profession and a
business - a distinction that is often presented in ways that no business
person from Lee Iaccoca to the corner grocer can fail to find offensive.
But in the end, they fail to develop a fully satisfactory theory of profes-
sionalism. The reason is that they, have bought into the primary source of
all the difficulties - the privatization of morality. Even while they insist
that lawyers must retain a core of moral consensus, they reconcile them-
selves to nobody else's doing so. There is no way this dichotomy can work.
Whatever people do, the practice of law is devoted primarily to helping
them do it, and secondarily to coping with the consequences of their hav-
ing done it. If lawyers do not occupy the same moral universe as other
people, they will have to spend most of their time feeling either alienated
or sold out.
The higher we set our professional aspirations, the more bizarre those
aspirations look when we apply them to a society where all moral judg-
ments are for the private individual to make and all private judgments are
of equal value. To adopt high standards of service to clients while taking
no responsibility for the goals that clients seek to achieve in using those
services is to betray the whole purpose of a profession by placing altruism
at the service of self-interest, honesty at the service of chicanery, decency
at the service of debauchery, order at the service of violence. Moreover, it
places the whole professional enterprise at the service of wealth and
power. By suggesting that all clients are morally equal, it leaves us no
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reason not to prefer the ones who can give the most generous rewards.
Terrell and Wildman seem to base their analysis on a perception that
the community in which lawyers operate is irretrievably broken down.
Their claim is that "the legal system embodies our last vestiges of a sense
of community - of shared expectations and values." 1 I profoundly disa-
gree. If we had no more sense of community than our legal system embod-
ies, neither we nor our legal system could survive. In fact, I think we have
much more - as anyone can observe who reads bumper stickers or no-
tices yellow ribbons on trees. Communities are like families. They depend
not on shared values but on shared experiences. And they are there
whether or not we choose to pay attention to them.
I am not at all sure that Terrell and Wildman are right to see a general
lack of shared values in our society. Such a lack may characterize the elite
to which lawyers ex officio belong, but I do not know how deeply the rest
of society is affected by it. It does not make too much difference. The
problem of practicing a profession in a community is more complicated if
there are no shared values, but its basic terms do not change. The founda-
tion of professionalism, whether for doctors or for lawyers or for plumb-
ers, is belief in what one is doing. A plurality of moral attitudes in our
society does not affect our professional stance. We act like professionals
not because other people believe in what we are doing, but because we do.
Professionalism does not become a problem for architects even when half
of the country thinks their buildings are ugly. It would not become a
problem for doctors even if half of the country turned Christian Scientist.
But it would become a problem if most architects became convinced that
designing brothels was all one with designing hospitals or most doctors
believed that performing facelifts for the rich and famous was all one with
curing ratbite fever in the slums. It became a problem for Albert Speer
when he started designing buildings to glorify Hitler. It would have been
a problem for Hawkeye Pierce if he had accepted the offer made on one
MASH episode to leave his unit and become personal physician to a
general.
The lawyers who seldom worry about professionalism are those whose
practices are ideologically defined - the ACLU lawyers, the right to life
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lawyers, the welfare rights advocates, the lawyers who represent churches
in religious freedom cases. If they believe in the ideology that governs
their practice, it is easy for them to be "professional" because it is easy for
them to believe in what they are doing. But what about the rest of us? If
we are also to believe in what we are doing, we must find something
broader than ideological agreement with our clients to support our service
to them.
The middle ground between ideological uniformity and moral indiffer-
ence is occupied by respect. A human being is a creature with an eternal
destiny, a free will, a corruptible mind, and a vulnerable heart. Respect
for people involves giving full recognition to this complex reality whenever
and however we intervene in their affairs. This recognition will give us a
way of practicing law that is neither sanctimonious nor sold out - that
takes our clients and their purposes with entire seriousness and yet does
not allow them to float in a moral vacuum.
The same recognition will give us a way of situating our practice in our
community. Again, the analogy of the family is useful. Most of us have
the experience of dealing with family members who need our help, but do
not share all of our values. We have found ways to help and support them
without compromising our own integrity. We can do the same with our
neighbors, even when our neighbors are our clients.
This understanding of what we are doing can support a professionalism
that will subsume and perfect the values Terrell and Wildman set before
us - both those they consider trivial2 and those they adopt.3 It will en-
able us to approach our clients not with a mixture of bonhomie and per-
missiveness, but with genuine concern.4 It will turn our service to the poor
from a spare time activity to a quality of our presence in the downtown
offices where the burdens of the poor are actually'fashioned, and where, if
we choose, we can expose our clients to the social consequences of what
they do.5 It will let us bestow our technical excellence (if we acquire it) on
objects worthy of it.6 It will provide us with a basis for developing an
2 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 1, at 419-21.
3 Id. at 424-31.
4 Id. at 419-20.
5 Id. at 420-21, 428-31.
1 Id. at 425-26.
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agenda with our clients that is consistent with our own integrity," with
that of our clients,' with that of our colleagues, 9 and with that of the legal
system itself.'0
Id. at 426.
8 Id. at 428.
SId. at 427.
I0 d. at 426-27.
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